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JURISDICTION
This appeal was within the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-(3)(j)(1953)(as amended). The case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) by an order dated
December 23, 2004. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-4 (2)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erred in applying a legal standard of "best efforts"

that was the functional equivalent of the less exacting "good faith" standard by failing to
consider a party's diligence as the touchstone of its "best efforts" analysis. The trial
court's interpretation of a contract is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. Pack v.
Case, 30 P.3d 436, 440 (Utah App. 2001). This issue was preserved on appeal during
closing arguments of the trial held February 10-12, 2004. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 688.)
2.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Defendants had used their

"best efforts" in resolving URI's relationship with Morgan Gas & Oil as required by the
Settlement Agreement dated June 26, 1996. This issue presents a question of fact, which
is reviewed to determine whether it is clearly erroneous. Pack v. Case, 30 P.3d 436, 440
(Utah App. 2001). This issue was preserved on appeal during closing arguments of the
trial held February 10-12, 2004. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 688.)

1

3.

Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to Defendants based

on its finding that Defendants were the prevailing party on Plaintiffs' claim that
Defendants failed to use their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships with Morgan
Gas & Oil where Defendants' tardy compliance with the unwinding requirement only
came about as a result of Plaintiffs' lawsuit seeking judicial enforcement of the
unwinding. The question of whether the Defendants were entitled to an award of fees is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65
P.3d 1134, 1145 (Utah 2001). The amount of the award is a fact question which is
reviewed to determine whether it is clearly erroneous. Id. This issue was preserved on
appeal during closing arguments of the trial held February 10-12, 2004. (R. at 3466;
Transcript at 677.)
DETERMINATIVE LAW
There are no constitutional, statutory, or other provisions of law, the interpretation
of which is determinative of the issues presented herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Settlement Agreement

A multiplicity of litigation involving a multitude of parties was settled by way of a
settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") entered into on June 26, 1996. A
copy of the Settlement Agreement is included in the addendum as Exhibit "A." Parties to
the Settlement Agreement included Plaintiffs Mark Jones ("Jones") and Mark
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Technologies Corp. ("MTC") and Defendants John Fife ("Fife"), Lyle D. Hurd ("Hurd")
and Utah Resources International ("URI").
The Settlement Agreement was comprised of many provisions whereby both the
Plaintiffs and Defendants assumed responsibility for the completion of various agreed
upon obligations. At issue in this case, is an obligation found in Paragraph 1.1 of the
Settlement Agreement which provides:
1.
Unless otherwise provided, the following events shall occur at
Closing (as defined herein):
* * *

1.
The Parties hereto shall exercise their best efforts to
account for, pay, compromise, unwind, and/or terminate all existing
contractual relationships between URI and Morgan Gas & Oil Co.
(Addendum, Exhibit "A," at 3, 8).
The plain language of this provision requires the Defendants to exercise their "best
efforts" to effectively unwind and/or terminate all existing contractual relationships
between URI and Morgan Gas & Oil Co. ("MGO"). The essence of this case is the
Plaintiffs' contention that the Defendants breached their duty to exercise their "best
efforts" in unwinding the contractual relationships between URI and MGO.

3

B.

The unwinding of URI from MGO.1

From the time the Settlement Agreement was entered into in June of 1996,
throughout the balance of 1996 and throughout all of 1997, Plaintiffs persistently
requested that Defendants comply with the Settlement Agreement by taking action to
wind up URTs relationship with MGO. (R. at 966.) In fact, in June of 1997, Jones made
a motion in one of the cases settled by the Settlement Agreement requesting that the court
enforce the Settlement Agreement by ordering Defendants to wind up URTs relationship
with MGO. URI opposed the Motion. (R. at 964.) Shortly thereafter, Fife told Jones that
URI would never pay money to MGO to wind up the relationship unless MGO filed a
lawsuit. (R. at 1099.) By separate letters dated August 21, 1997 and October 10, 1997,
Jones requested in writing that URI comply with the Settlement Agreement with regard to
MGO. (R. at 1099.) Jones received no response to his requests. (R. at 1099.)
Throughout the period, URI provided no information to Jones or its other directors of any
actions it had taken or was planning to take to wind up the relationship with MGO, and

1

The facts set forth in this section do not represent the Plaintiffs' fulfillment of the
marshaling requirement that is imposed on a party challenging a trial court's finding of
fact. See Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994). Section II of the
Argument section contains the Plaintiffs' compliance with the marshaling requirement
where the Plaintiffs have marshaled every piece of evidence, received both orally and
through documentary exhibits, that supports the trial court's finding of fact that
Defendants used their "best efforts" to unwind URTs business and contractual
relationships with MGO. However, the facts as set forth in this section are solely
intended to provide this Court with a factual footing necessary to adjudicating the issues
raised on appeal.
4

ignored all requests from Jones and MTC for information concerning such actions. (R. at
966.) As of the time the Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on January 20, 1998 seeking to
enforce the unwinding provision, no substantial action had been taken to unwind URI's
relationships with MGO.
Once Plaintiffs filed their complaint, the Defendants sprung into action in order to
unwind URI from MGO. The first mention of the MGO unwinding in the minutes of
URI's board of directors meetings occurred on February 27, 1998, where Fife made a
motion for a resolution authorizing URI's officers to use their best efforts to wind up the
contractual relationships with MGO by the end of 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit
5w.) Prior to that meeting, the MGO unwinding had never been addressed by URI's
board of directors. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5a-w.)
Despite the resolution, URI took no further action to unwind the MGO relationship
for several months. On June 25, 1998, the trial court heard argument on URI's first
Motion for Summary Judgment on the MGO claim, and denied the Motion. (R. at 449451.) The following week, Fife and URI began their first serious discussions towards
unwinding the relationship. (R. at 925.) URI and Fife ultimately scheduled a conference
call for July 15, 1998, and on July 20, 1998, Fife made a written proposal to MGO. (R. at
15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12c.) The July 20, 1998 proposal consisted of less than two pages
and was the first proposal of any kind made by URI since the Settlement Agreement was
entered two years earlier. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12c.)
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After brief discussions, Fife made a revised proposal on August 1, 1998, which
MGO's president verbally approved. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12e.) The parties made
further revisions to the proposal and drafted a Letter of Intent dated August 21, 1998
which was approved by URI's Board of Directors on September 2, 1998. (R. at 15;
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5z.) The process was completed when the parties executed a
Partnership Settlement Agreement on December 15, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit
15.)
Once Defendants actually began to actively address the MGO unwinding, the
entire process was completed and documents signed within a period of five months.
However, from June of 1996 through July of 1998, the only documentary evidence of
Defendants' effort to unwind from MGO was a two-page spreadsheet prepared on May
30, 1997 and a board resolution authorizing the officers to act on February 27, 1998. (R.
at 15; Defendants' Exhibit 19; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w.)
C.

Procedural History.

On January 20, 1998, MTC and Jones filed a complaint alleging, among other
things, that Defendants had breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement by failing to
use their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationship with MGO. (R. at 1.) On August
17, 1998, the Defendants filed an Answer, which included Counterclaims against MTC
and Jones for breach of the Settlement Agreement and for payment of attorneys fees. (R.
at 470.) On January 1, 1999, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all
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claims. (R. at 561.) The Motions were heard on November 12, 1999, and the Court
entered a Memorandum Decision on January 5, 2000 granting summary judgment and
dismissing all of MTC and Jones' claims. (R. at 1515, 1516.)
On February 17, 2000, the Defendants moved for an order awarding attorneys fees
and costs against Plaintiffs. After briefing and argument, the Motion for attorney's fees
was granted by a Memorandum Decision dated January 4, 2001. (R. at 1834.) A final
Judgment Order was entered on February 26, 2001. (R. at 1927.) Plaintiffs filed a Notice
of Appeal on March 1, 2001. (R. at 1933.)
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on
several of Plaintiffs' claims, including the claim that Defendants had failed to use their
"best efforts" to unwind the relationships between URI and MGO. (R. at 1956.) This
Court remanded that issue to the trial court for resolution of the unresolved fact question
of whether Defendants had breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement by failing to
use their "best efforts" in unwinding URI's relationships from MGO, and for a
determination of which party was the "prevailing party" on the claim for purposes of
awarding attorneys fees. (R. at 1958-1960.)
After a trial addressing the issues remanded to the trial court, the trial court held
that Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy their burden of proof to demonstrate, to a
preponderance of the evidence, that Defendants had not used their "best efforts" to
unwind and/or terminate all existing contractual relationships with MGO. (R. at 2121.)
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On November 17, 2004, the trial court entered an Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees in
which the court awarded attorneys fees and costs to the Plaintiffs in the amount of
$34,834.02 and attorneys fees and costs to the Defendants in the amount of $110,187.77.
(R. at 3413.) The court then set the Plaintiffs' award off against the award to Defendants
and held that Defendants were entitled to attorneys fees and costs in the net amount of
$75,353.75. (R. at 3413.)
On December 17, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal (R. at 3418,) and on
January 7, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their Docketing Statement with this Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed an error of law by applying an interpretation of "best
efforts" that fails to consider a party's diligence as the touchstone of the "best efforts"
analysis. Courts which have distinguished between the "best efforts" standard and that of
"good faith" have noted that a party's diligence in fulfilling its agreed upon obligation is
the distinguishing factor between the more exacting "best efforts" standard and the less
stringent standard of "good faith." While the trial court purported to apply a "best
efforts" analysis in this case, its failure to scrutinize the diligence with which the
Defendants attempted to unwind from MGO coupled with the court's focus on the
reasonableness and intent of the Defendants' actions, and inactions, rendered the trial
court's "best efforts" analysis the functional equivalent of the less exacting "good faith"
standard.
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The trial court also erred in concluding as a factual matter that Defendants used
their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships with MGO. After marshaling the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings, Plaintiffs contend that the clear weight of
evidence in this case not only shows the trial court erred in holding that Defendants used
their "best efforts" in unwinding URI's relationship with MGO, but that Defendants
expended virtually no effort whatsoever to fulfill its obligation to unwind from MGO for
a period of twenty months.
Additionally, the clear weight of evidence contradicts the Defendants' assertion
that URI's unwinding with MGO was a complex issue requiring twenty months of delay.
Moreover, the facts show that Defendants only began to dedicate any effort whatsoever to
the unwinding after the Plaintiffs had commenced legal action seeking to judicially
enforce the unwinding. The clear weight of the evidence in this case shows that the trial
court's finding that Defendants used their "best efforts" in fulfilling their obligation to
unwind its relationships with MGO was clearly erroneous.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that this Court should remand the award of attorneys
fees to the trial court for a recalculation of the award based on a finding that Plaintiffs are
the prevailing party on their claim that Defendants breached the Settlement Agreement by
failing to use their "best efforts." Plaintiffs contend that because the Defendants only
complied with the unwinding provision as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit, that the
Plaintiffs should be deemed the prevailing party as to this claim and the trial court should
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modify its fee award to reflect this conclusion. Plaintiffs do not challenge the method
implemented by the trial court in calculating the award of attorneys fees; but rather,
contend that the trial court should recalculate those fees consistent with a ruling that
Plaintiffs were the prevailing party.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY FAILING
TO CONSIDER THE DEFENDANTS5 DILIGENCE AS THE
TOUCHSTONE OF ITS "BEST EFFORTS" STANDARD, AND
THEREBY APPLIED A LEGAL STANDARD THAT WAS THE
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE LESS EXACTING STANDARD
OF "GOOD FAITH."

The trial court erred in applying a legal standard of "best efforts" as provided in
the Settlement Agreement that was the functional equivalent of a less exacting "good
faith" standard. The Seventh Circuit has noted that courts applying the "best efforts" and
"good faith" standards have at times "muddled" these two concepts. Beraha v. Baxter
Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1445 (7th Cir. 1992). Jones contends that by focusing
on the reasonableness and intent of the Defendants' actions rather than considering the
diligence with which Defendants attempted to unwind URI's relationships with MGO, the
trial court effectively "muddled" the distinction between the more stringent "best efforts"
standard and the less exacting standard of "good faith.
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A.

The Legal Standard of "Best Efforts" is More Exacting Then
That of "Good Faith."

A party required to use its "best efforts" in the fulfilment of a contractual
obligation is held to a higher standard of performance than a party required to exercise
"good faith." The Utah Supreme Court has held that to satisfy the contractual obligation
of "good faith," a party's actions "must be consistent with the agreed upon common
purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991). Pursuant to its plain language,
"good faith" does not require that a party engage in any specific, timely, or consistent
efforts to achieve its obligation; but rather, that whatever efforts the party does make,
however minimal, not be contrary to the other party's expectations. In short, "good faith"
is a baseline standard which only requires that a party's actions not manifest an attempt to
sabotage the agreed upon obligation or undermine the other party's expectations.
In contrast, "best efforts" demands a higher standard of performance and
accountability. Black's Law Dictionary defines "best efforts" as "[djiligent attempts to
carry out an obligation." and that "[a]s a standard, a best-efforts obligation is stronger
than a good-faith obligation." Black's Law Dictionary 152 (7th ed. 1999)(emphasis
added.) Pursuant to this definition, the distinction between the "stronger" obligation of
"best efforts" and the less exacting standard of "good faith" is a party's diligent effort to
fulfill its obligation rather than merely not acting contrary to another party's expectations.
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In Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., 95 P.3d 1171, 1179 (Utah App.
2004), this Court held that "best efforts is primarily a subjective standard under which a
party agrees to do the best that it can regardless of the capabilities of others." This
definition is further explained by decisions of courts in other jurisdictions. In Macksey v.
Egan, 633 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass.App.Ct. 1994), the Massachusetts Court of Appeals
held that in the natural sense of the words "[b]est efforts means that a party put its
muscles to work to perform with the full energy and fairness that the promises and
reasonable implications of the contract require."2 Additionally, in Gilson v. Rainin
Instrument, LLC, 2005 WL 1899471 (W.D.Wis. 2005), the court held that the "duty to use
best efforts requires the defendant to use "reasonable efforts and due diligence" in the
promotion of the plaintiffs medical supplies. Id. at 5 3 The court also stated that "[b]est
efforts is a standard that has diligence as its essence" and that when compared to the
"good^faith" standard "best efforts is the more exacting." 2005 WL 1899471 at 5 quoting
E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in
Contract Law, 46 U.Pitt. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1984).

2

Other courts have followed this reasoning as evidence by Western Geophysical
Co. v. Bolt Assoc, 584 F.2d 1164, 1170-1171 (2d Cir. 1978); Triple-A Baseball Club
Assocs. v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 225-226 (1st. Cir. 1987);
Polyglycoat Corp. v. C.P.C Distrib., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
3

As an unpublished opinion, a copy of the Gilson decisions has been included in
the addendum and is marked as Exhibit "B."
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In the natural sense of the words, "best efforts" requires that a party not merely
intend to do well but that it actually "put its muscles to work" with all "due diligence" and
"full energy" in attempting to fulfill its obligation. Plaintiffs contend that based on this
Court's standard for determining "best efforts," a trial court must look to a party's
diligence in order to properly determine whether that party has in fact exercised "best
efforts" or whether it has merely acted in "good faith." Given the propensity of courts to
muddle these two concepts, it is imperative that trial courts consider the diligence of a
party as the touchstone of its analysis when determining whether "best efforts" have been
exerted.
B.

The Trial Court Failed to Apply the Appropriate Standard for
Determining "Best Efforts" By Neglecting to Consider the
Defendants9 Diligence in Unwinding URFs Relationships with
MGO.

The trial court committed an error of law in this case by applying a legal standard
of "best efforts" that omitted as its touchstone evidence of a party's diligence, thereby
rendering its analysis virtually identical to the less stringent standard of "good faith." The
trial court began its analysis by holding that "best efforts" means to "make the best effort
possible in the context of the circumstances and situation." (R. at 2122.) While at first
blush this articulation may appear identical to the "best efforts" standard set forth by this
Court in Carlson, the trial court erred by applying its own definition which focused on the
reasonableness and intent of the Defendants' actions rather than considering the
Defendants' diligence, or lack thereof, in attempting to unwind URTs relationships with
13

MGO. The trial court's emphasis on the reasonableness of the Defendants' actions and
the Defendants' intent is essentially a "good faith" rather than "best efforts" analysis.
The trial court concluded that it could not be said that Defendants failed to use
their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships with MGO where "[defendants also
had a fiduciary obligation to accomplish their contractual obligation to the benefit of
URI" and that "[s]evering the relationship with MGO would be a relatively easy task, if
URI's best interests were ignored." (R. at 2122.) Moreover, the trial court concluded that
Fife had to first "resolve specific situations both directly and indirectly connected to the
MGO unwinding" and that Fife was justified in assigning varying degrees of priority to
different tasks "both within the unwinding process, and in relation to all activities
connected with his performance as president of the corporation." (R. at 2122.) In short,
the trial court rationalized the Defendants' lack of diligence on the grounds of
reasonableness, rather than applying a "best efforts" standard that focuses on a party's
diligence.
The fact that Fife chose to "first marshal, organize and analyze the records of
URI," ( r at 2122,) before taking action may be considered reasonable, and thereby satisfy
the "good faith" standard, but a twenty month gap wherein URI had absolutely no
communications with MGO to discuss the unwinding is clearly indicative of a lack of
diligence. Fife's decision to prioritize other matters ahead of the unwinding may have
been reasonable given the disorganized state of URI, but the failure to even mention the
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unwinding with MGO at URI's board meetings from July 305 1996 through February 27,
1998 again indicates a complete lack of diligence. While there was no evidence that Fife
or the other Defendants intended to frustrate or sabotage the unwinding with MGO, such
evidence only satisfies a "good faith" standard and not the more exacting standard of
"best efforts."
It is interesting to note that only after Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on January 20,
1998 to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement did Defendants suddenly engage
in a flurry of activity in an attempt to unwind URI from MGO. This sudden burst of
activity, in immediate response to the lawsuit begs the question of what circumstances
changed from one day to the next that suddenly allowed URI to put its muscles to work in
unwinding its affairs with MGO. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' level of activity
regarding the MGO unwinding after the Plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed is representative of
what constitutes the Defendants' "best efforts" in this case.
The trial court committed an error of law by failing to consider the Defendants'
diligence as the touchstone of the "best efforts" analysis. Plaintiffs contends that only by
considering the degree of diligence a party has undertaken to fulfill its contractual
obligation can the "best efforts" standard be determined and distinguished from the less
exacting standard of "good faith." In this case, the trial court conducted a subjective
analysis that looked to the Defendants' intent and reasonableness of actions rather than
scrutinizing URI's diligence, or lack thereof, in the fulfillment of its contractual
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obligation to unwind from Morgan. Accordingly, the trial court committed an error of
law by effectively muddling the "best efforts" standard with that of "good faith."
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS USED THEIR
"BEST-EFFORTS" IN UNWINDING URI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
MGO IS SO LACKING IN SUPPORT AS TO BE AGAINST THE
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.

Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court's finding that Defendants used their
"best-efforts" in unwinding URI's relationships with MGO was clearly erroneous based
on the facts in evidence. To successfully challenge a trial court's factual findings, "[a]n
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against
the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Jacobs v.
Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994) quoting In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885,
886 (Utah 1989). In this case, despite marshaling all of the evidence that supports the
trial court's factual finding that Defendants used their "best efforts," the trial court's
finding was against the clear weight of evidence and is clearly erroneous.
The trial court's holding that Defendants used their "best efforts" in unwinding
URI's relationships with MGO was based primarily on Fife's testimony that there were
complex issues involved and that Fife needed time to navigate his way through those
issues and to ease John Morgan ("Morgan") into the complexities of the deal. Fife also
testified that he met with Morgan various times to discuss the unwinding, and that there
were other priorities that URI needed to dispense of before it could fulfill its obligation to
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unwind from Morgan. Plaintiffs have marshaled the evidence that supports the trial
court's findings below with appropriate citations to the record and trial transcript and has
categorized the evidence in support of the trial court's findings as either: (1) evidence in
the form of oral testimony taken at trial, or (2) evidence in the form of exhibits submitted
at trial.
Evidence Received at Trial as Oral Testimony:
Testimony of Lyle D. Hurd:
•

•

After the Settlement Agreement, the board had an ongoing dialogue
regarding how to take care of the unwinding with Morgan pursuant
to the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 3464; Transcript at 157.)
Unwinding with Morgan was probably one of Mr. Jones' very strong
priorities. (R. at 3464; Transcript at 159.)

Testimony of Mark Jones:
•

•

•
•

•

Liability for an environmental remediation and a promissory note
obligation served as obstacles to completing the unwinding of URI
and Morgan. (R. at 3464; Transcript at 184-185.)
The unwinding of URI from Morgan came up at URI board meetings
and the board simply said they were working on it. (R. at 3464;
Transcript at 205.)
Discussions at numerous board meetings discussing the progress
with that unwinding. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 311.)
There may have been one conversation between Mr. Bennion and
Mr. Eldgredge concerning the winding up. (R. at 3465; Transcript at
314.)
URI participated in negotiations with at least one other party to enter
into a partition agreement regarding the Southgate Resort Limited
Partnership. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 318-319.)
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Testimony of J. Michael Bennion:
Remembered meeting with Ladd Eldredge of URI to discuss the
separation of URI and Morgan on October 4,1996. (R..at 3465;
Transcript at 395.)
Ladd Eldredge of URI had prepared a spreadsheet in November of
1995 to discuss the financial interests shared between URI and
Morgan and important debts that Morgan owed to URI. (R. at 3465;
Transcript at 396.)
Was satisfied that between July 1, 1998 and August 26, 1998, URI
was using its best efforts to bring about a resolution. (R. at 3465;
Transcript at 413.)
Was satisfied that between August 26, 1998 and December 15, 1998,
URI was using its best efforts to finalize the deal. (R. at 3465;
Transcript at 414.)
Because the assets and liabilities of Morgan, the Morgan Sheltered
Trust, John H. Morgan, Jr., individually, and the John H. Morgan, Sr.
Estate, that the parties were concerned about how those assets and
liabilities would be accounted for in any final settlement between
URI and Morgan. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 420.)
Agreed that any unwinding of the Service Station had to consider the
interests and liabilities or tax consequences that might be assigned to
each limited partner. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 421.)
Agreed that any unwinding of Southgate Plaza Limited Partnership,
or the Southgate Plaza general partnership also had to consider the
interests of the other partners. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 423.)
Agreed that after his departure from URI in 1994, URI's records
were not in the most organized state. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 426.)
Stated that he was aware that URI had other things on its plate that
required its attention. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 428.)
Agreed that in 1996, URI had a new board and that the board was at
an informational disadvantage in terms of understanding all of the
issues that had been in existence for many years. (R. at 3465;
Transcript at 429.)
Some time was likely required on URI's part to figure out the
muddle of surviving issues. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 429.)
Agreed that there was back-up information that had to be located.
(R. at 3465; Transcript at 433.)

18

•

The Southgate Plaza partition was integrally tied to the winding up
of URI and Morgan because Morgan was a one-third partner in it.
(R. at 3465; Transcript at 441.)

Testimony of John Fife:
•

•

•
••

•

•

•

•

•

•

When he arrived on the scene in 1996 he and URI spent a
considerable amount of time in the investigative process getting to
know the parties involved in the different asset partnerships. (R. at
3466; Transcript at 500.)
Testified that he spoke to Allen Roth about the issues and the
complexities of the partnership tax and exposure and liabilities URI
might have. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 500.)
During 1997 URI sold the service station which he believed to be a
required step in the unwinding. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 501.)
Believed the sale of the service station was vital because URI could
not separate out an environmentally contaminated building and land
to any particular partner and that URI had to liquidate the service
station and pay out the assets. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 501.)
Fife personally and URI took on an environmental remediation
obligation after the sale of the service station. (R. at 3466;
Transcript at 506.)
During 1997 URI had to deal with the Plaza General Partnership
which had about 6.6 acres of commercial grade land to facilitate the
unwinding with Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 507.)
A partition of the Plaza General Partnership was necessary to
effectuate the unwinding with Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at
509.)
Spoke with John Morgan a lot to keep Morgan informed of what
URI was doing with respect to the Service Station and Plaza General
plot of ground. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 510.)
URI prioritized its obligations pursuant to the settlement agreement
according to what they deemed to be the most significant and the
most economic and that there were numerous complexities that faced
URI. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 510-514.)
URI prepared documents summarizing payments, assets, liabilities
and partnerships involving Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 514518.)
URI and Fife used their best efforts to bring about the unwinding of
URI and Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 559.)
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•

•

His priority was to focus on those things that were the most
economic and provided the largest savings for URL (R. at 3466;
Transcript at 562.)
URI had to dedicate many of its efforts to dissolving varying
partnerships revolving around URI's relationship with Morgan in
order to unwind. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 577-580.)
He had to spend time to give John Morgan the chance to understand
issues, think about the implications, and feel comfortable with
everything in order to complete the unwinding and that he could not
push John Morgan along. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 591.)
He met with John Morgan whenever he could and other directors of
Morgan to discuss, among other things, the unwinding of URI and
Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 591-592.)
The whole matter of unwinding with Morgan and dissolving its
associated partnerships and dealing with the surviving liabilities as
well as complying with other terms of the Settlement Agreement was
more complicated than he originally thought and that he had to bring
in legal counsel to help sort through the information. (R. at 3466;
Transcript at 622-623.)

Evidence Received at Trial as Exhibits that Support the Trial Court's Factual
Finding:

•

•

•
•

Letter from John Fife to Mark Jones dated April 12, 1997 explaining
the complexity of unwinding with Morgan. (R. at 15; Defendants'
Exhibit 18.)
Summary spreadsheet summarizing partnerships involving Morgan
prepared May 30, 1997. (R. at 15; Defendants' Exhibit 19.)
URI Board Minutes for Friday, February 27, 1998. Resolution
authorizing use of best efforts to complete the wind up of the MGO
contracts by year-end 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w.)
Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan
unwinding dated July 20, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12c.)
Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan
unwinding dated August 1, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12e.)
Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan
unwinding dated August 7, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12i.)
Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan
unwinding dated August 21, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit
12k.)
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•

•

Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan
unwinding dated August 26, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit
12m.)
URI Board Minutes for September 2, 1998: Fife reports that he is
working with John Morgan to complete the URI/Morgan unwinding.
(R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5z.)
URI Board Minutes for November 11, 1998: Fife reported on the
URI/Morgan wind up. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5aa.)

Despite the evidence marshaled above, Plaintiffs contends that the clear weight of
the evidence in this case contradicts the trial court's finding that Defendants used their
"best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships with MGO and the finding should be
reversed as clearly erroneous. The trial court's finding is contradicted by the weight of
evidence in this case that establishes: (1) the unwinding between URI and MGO had
already been contemplated and was not as complicated nor intricate a matter as
Defendants contend, and (2) it was only after Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit to enforce the
terms of the Settlement Agreement that Defendants began to exert any diligence at all in
attempting to complete the unwinding process
A.

The Clear Weight Of The Evidence Establishes That The
Unwinding Between URI And MGO Had Previously Been
Contemplated And Was Neither a Complicated Nor Intricate
Matter Requiring Thirty Months To Complete.

The trial court's finding that Defendants used their "best efforts" to unwind URI's
relationship with MGO was erroneous based on evidence that shows that the unwinding
was not so complex a matter as to justify the lengthy delay in unwinding. While
Defendants presented some evidence that its unwinding with MGO presented numerous
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complexities including liabilities, expenses and assets that needed to be liquidated, the
clear weight of evidence shows that even before the Settlement Agreement was executed,
the two parties had already discussed most of the issues relating to the unwinding. The
evidence shows that MGO was completely cooperative and willing to unwind from the
outset, and that the issues Defendants contend were integral to the unwinding were
neither essential nor complex at all. In the end, the evidence shows that once Defendants
stopped ignoring the issue and began serious efforts toward unwinding the relationship,
an agreement in principle was reached within several days and the whole matter was
concluded in less than five months.
Testimony was received at trial that established that both URI and MGO had been
involved in serious discussions prior to the Settlement Agreement addressing specific
issues regarding their unwinding, and that MGO had already sent several correspondences
to URI setting forth the manner in which the relationship could be unwound properly. (R.
at 3464; Transcript at 193-194.) The fact that URI and MGO had already engaged in
serious discussion involving the issues regarding the unwinding shows that the two
parties had already laid the groundwork for completing the unwinding. Moreover,
testimony was given stating that MGO was completely interested and willing to complete
the unwinding. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 397.)
Defendants also attempted to show that there were numerous issues involved in the
unwinding that required lengthy and prolonged analysis. This contention is contradicted
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by the evidence of this case. Evidence was received at trial that MGO's interest in
Service Station No. 2 did not require the sale of the Service Station, and that such a sale
had no bearing whatsoever on the unwinding between URI and MGO. (R. at 3465;
Transcript at 367-368.) Additionally, the partition regarding the Southgate Plaza General
Partnership and Southgate Resort General Partnership land was not a necessary
prerequisite to unwinding either. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 368.)
While Defendants may have assigned a lower priority to fulfilling its obligation
to unwind its relationship with MGO, even with a lower priority, the unwinding should
not have taken over two years to effectuate, particularly given the willingness of MGO to
complete the unwinding and the groundwork that had already been established to
complete it. Additionally, the resolution of issues such as the sale of Service Station No.
2 and the Southgate Partition were not essential nor integral to the MGO unwinding.
Accordingly, the evidence shows that Defendants did not use their "best efforts" to
unwind its relationship with MGO.
B.

The Clear Weight Of The Evidence Establishes That Defendants
Only Began To Exert Their "Best Efforts" To Complete The
Unwinding With MGO When Plaintiffs Filed Their Lawsuit To
Enforce the Terms Of The Settlement Agreement.

The clear weight of evidence shows that Defendants only began to diligently
pursue the unwinding with MGO as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit to seek judicial
enforcement of the unwinding. The evidence is clear that: (1) there were no
correspondence from the Defendants to MGO regarding the unwinding until after the
23

Plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed; (2) there was never any mention of the MGO unwinding in
any of URI's board meetings prior to the Plaintiffs' lawsuit; and (3) there were no internal
memoranda or work product aside from a single two-page spreadsheet prepared in May of
1997 prior to the filing of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit. In short, the Defendants only exercised
their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationship from MGO after the Plaintiffs filed their
lawsuit.
URI has failed to produce any documentary evidence to show that it either
contacted Morgan regarding the wind-up or even discussed the wind-up internally.
From the time the Settlement Agreement was entered into in June of 1996 until the time
the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement in
January of 1998, the only documentary evidence that shows Defendants' attempt to;
unwind is a single two-page spreadsheet prepared on May 30, 1997 that details the
various asset and liability values of URI and MGO's shared partnerships. (R. at 15;
Defendants' Exhibit 19.) This is the extent of Defendants' documentary evidence
showing they used their "best efforts" in attempting to unwind with MGO prior to the
lawsuit in January of 1998. During this gap period there are no letters written to MGO
discussing the various issues involving the wind-up or internal memoranda analyzing the
wind-up. There are no minutes or notes from meetings between URI and MGO and there
are no proposals prepared by URI to send to MGO for its approval. There is simply a
two-page spreadsheet listing assets and liabilities of the shared partnerships.
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Moreover, on May 21, 1997, Jones' legal counsel sent a letter to Fife's legal
counsel inquiring as to why nothing had been accomplished with respect to the unwinding
from MGO per the terms of the Settlement Agreement and accusing URI of failing to
fulfill its obligation to use "best efforts." (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7.) Interestingly,
when Fife's attorney responded to this accusatory letter, he made no mention of a single
thing URI had been doing to refute Jones' claims that URI was failing in its duty to use
"best efforts." (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8.) There was no mention in the letter of any
efforts or actions the Defendants had taken in furtherance of the unwinding. Instead, the
letter simply stated that Defendants had other priorities and that Jones had no right to tell
Defendants what they should be doing. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8.)
The only activity that Defendants took to advance the unwinding with MGO came
about solely as a result of the legal action commenced by the Plaintiffs in 1998. Plaintiffs
submitted into evidence the minutes from URI's board meetings that were held from June
5, 1996 through November 11, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5a-aa.) The first time
the subject of unwinding with MGO is even mentioned comes in the first meeting
following the filing of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit held on February 17, 1998, when a
resolution was passed authorizing use of best efforts to complete the wind up of the MGO
contracts by year-end 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w.) The minutes show that
there was absolutely no discussion at all in any of the board meetings regarding the MGO
unwinding until after the Plaintiffs' lawsuit had been filed. However, once the lawsuit
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was filed, the minutes from every subsequent board meeting included notes on the
unwinding with MGO. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w-aa.) Additionally, the only time
any internal memorandum appear discussing the unwinding occurs after the lawsuit was
filed. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12a-u.) Defendants' flurry of activity to unwind its
relationships with MGO occurred only after Plaintiffs initiated legal proceedings in an
attempt to compel the Defendants to honor the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered
almost two-years prior. The sudden proliferation of internal memoranda regarding the
unwinding along with the sudden interest the URJ board took in discussing the unwinding
were both nonexistent until Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit.
The trial court's finding that Defendants used their "best efforts" in the resolution
and unwinding of its relationship with MGO is contrary to the clear weight of evidence in
this case. Defendants' contention that the unwinding was a complex matter that
necessitated a prolonged delay is erroneous when the evidence showed that URI's sale of
Service Station No. 2 had no relevance to the unwinding with MGO and that the
Southgate Plaza Limited Partnership partition only involved assigning a one-third value
of the 6.6 acre plot to MGO. Additionally, the evidence shows that MGO was a willing
partner in the wind-up and that the two parties had discussed the relevant issues of the
wind-up prior to the Settlement Agreement's directive. Furthermore, the clear weight of
evidence shows that the Defendants only exercised their "best efforts" to unwind with
MGO as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit.
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The evidence, as marshaled above, does not support a finding that Defendants used
their "best efforts" until after the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. Accordingly, the trial
court's conclusion that Defendants used their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships
with MGO should be reversed as clearly erroneous, and Plaintiffs should be deemed the
prevailing party on their claim.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO
THE DEFENDANTS AS THE PREVAILING PARTY WHERE
DEFENDANTS ONLY WOUND UP URI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
MGO AS A RESULT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' LAWSUIT SEEKING
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE WIND-UP PROVISION.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants were not entitled to an award of attorneys fees
as the prevailing party where Defendants only wound up URI's relationship with MGO as
the result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a party is a
"prevailing party" if the opposing party's tardy compliance with an obligation comes as a
result of a lawsuit. Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981).
In this case, Plaintiffs do not challenge the method used by the trial court to calculate its
fee award, but rather, Plaintiffs contend that they should be considered the prevailing
party since the evidence shows that Defendants' tardy compliance with the wind-up
provision came about only as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit.
As briefed extensively above, the record shows that only after the Plaintiffs filed
their lawsuit in January of 1998 did the Defendants begin to display any diligence at all in
attempting to unwind from MGO. Once the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, the Defendants
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sprung into action and discussed the MGO unwinding at URI's subsequent board
meetings, sent numerous correspondence to MGO regarding the unwinding and
completed the unwinding in less than five months, whereas for the twenty months prior to
the January, 1998 lawsuit, the Defendants sole effort to unwind took the form of a twopage spreadsheet.
The clear weight of evidence shows that Defendants' compliance with the
Settlement Agreement's directive to unwind URI's relationships with MGO came about
solely as the result of Plaintiffs' lawsuit. Therefore, according to the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Highland Construction, the Plaintiffs should be deemed the
"prevailing party" for purposes of its claim that Defendants failed to use their "best
efforts" in unwinding, and the fee award should be vacated and remanded to the trial
court for a recalculation of the award consistent with a finding that the Plaintiffs were the
prevailing party on their claim.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to reverse
the decision of the trial court.
DATED this ( j ^day of November, 2005.
WOODBURY & KESLER, P

iid W. Lambert,
Anthony M. Grove
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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EXHIBIT "A"

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is entered into the
June, 1996 among the following parties (collectively referred to herein as the "Parties"):
1.

Utah Resources International, Inc., a Utah corporation ("URI").

2.

R. Dee Erickson ("Erickson").

3.

E. Jay Sheen ("Sheen").

4.

Lyle D. Hurd ("Hurd").

5.

Mark G. Jones ("Jones").

6.

Mark Technologies Corporation, a California corporation ("MTC").

7.

Anne Morgan ("A Morgan").

8.

Victoria Morgan ("V Morgan").

9.

Inter-Mountain Capital Corp., a Delaware corporation ("IMC").

10.

John Fife ("Fife").

11.

Robinson &. Sheen, L.L.C.

day of

RECITALS
A.
The Parties are involved in various disputes and controversies involving the
operation, management, ownership of and business activities of URI, including, but not limited
to,, matters which ate the subject of the First State Action, the Second State Action and the First
Federal Action as defined below (collectively, the 'Tending Litigation")B.
A shareholders derivative action captioned as Ernest Muth, et al. v. John H.
Morgan. Jr. et al. was filed as Civil Number C-87-1632 in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, Utah (the "First State Action").
C.
A settlement agreement was entered into in the First State Action on April 6, 1993
(the " 1993 Settlement Agreement").
D.
Subsequently, URI brought an action to enforce the 1993 Settlement Agreement
in the First State Action which resulted in certain findings of fact and conclusions of law and an
order enforcing the Settlement Agreement entered by Judge Michael R. Murphy on October 4,
1995 (the "Murphy Order"). The Murphy Order has been appealed by JH Morgan and
DR Morgan and cross-appealed by URI.
E.
An Order to Show Cause has been filed in the First State Action by URI against
JH Morgan, DR Morgan, Mark Jones, MTC, Anne Morgan and Victoria Morgan, which is
pending.
F.
A shareholders derivative action captioned as Anne Morean et. al v. R. Dee
Erickson et. al was filed as Case Number 2:95CV-0661C in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, Central Division (the "First Federal Action").
G.
Pursuant to a Plan of Share Exchange and Share Exchange Agreement dated
February 16, 1995 among URI, Midwest Railroad Construction and Maintenance Corporation of
Wyoming, a Wyoming corporation ("Midwest"), Robert D. Wolff ("RD Wolff') and Judith J.
Wolff ("JJ Wolff')* URI acquired all outstanding shares of Midwest from RD Wolff and JJ Wolff
in exchange for 590,000 restricted shares of authorized but unissued shares of URI (the "Share
Exchange Agreement").
H.
In April of 1996 URI and Midwest, RD Wolff and JJ Wolff entered into a
Split-Off Agreement pursuant to which the Share Exchange Agreement was rescinded in a
transaction intended to qualify as a tax-free spin-off under the provisions of Section 355 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Recision Agreement").
I.
On April 5, 1996 URI entered into a letter of intent with IMC to sell a controlling
interest in URI to IMC upon terms and conditions set forth therein (the "IMC Letter of Intent"),
attached as Exhibit A and by this reference made a pan hereof. The IMC Letter of Intent was
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modified pursuant to a letter of May 31, 1996, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B and by
this reference made a part hereof. The IMC Letter of Intent is modified pursuant to the terms
and conditions of this Agreement.
^s*
J.

Fife is the sole shareholder of IMC.

K.
On May 17, 1996, a Complaint captioned as Mark Technology Com., et. al. v.
Utah Resources International. Inc.. et. al. was filed as Civil No. 96 090 3332CV in the Third
Judicial Court of Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Second State Action").
L.
The Second State Action included a request by MTC and others for a temporary
restraining order and injunction against the transactions contemplated in the IMC Letter of
Intent, which request shall be rescinded in accordance with the terms and conditions of this
Agreement.
M.
The Parties believe this Agreement is fair to and in the best interest of URI and all
shareholders of URI.
N.
The Parties have agreed to compromise and settle all of their disputes and claims
known or unknown, now existing or hereafter accruing, including, but not limited to, those which
are the subject of the Pending Litigation, upon the terms and conditions set forth herein.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein and for
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby
acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Unless otherwise provided, the following events shall occur at Closing (as defined

herein):
a.
The Parties agree they will use best efforts immediately following the
Closing to petition the Court in the First State Action for the purpose of terminating the
1993 Settlement Agreement Pending such termination, the Parties agree the 1993
Settlement Agreement and the Murphy Order shall continue in accordance with their
respective terms and provisions.
b.
The Parties agree to dismiss the Pending Litigation with prejudice, to
dismiss the Order to Show Cause referenced in the Recitals above, and agree to request
the Court to remove the temporary restraining order granted in the Second State Action
on the date of execution of this Agreement. The Parties agree, upon execution of this
Agreement, to take immediate steps to file for dismissal of the Pending Litigation. The
Parties will use their best efforts, in good faith, to obtain the dimissals within 60 days of
the date hereof. Notice shall be given to shareholders of URI in such manner as each
court directs.
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c.
The closing of the transactions contemplated herein ("Closing") shall
occur at the offices of Robinson & Sheen in Salt Lake City, Utah, no later than seven (7)
calendar days after the date hereof.
d.
Except for those matters specifically set forth in this Agreement which
create continuing future rights and obligations of the Parties, the Parties hereto, and each
of them, for themselves, their respective predecessors, subsidiaries, controlled and
controlling affiliated corporations and entities, past and present, as well as the respective
directors, officers, stockholders, parmers, agents, attorneys, servants, and employees, past
and present, and affiliates or nominees of parties (as defined under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934), heirs, assigns, predecessors and successors in interest, and each
of them, effective upon Closing of this Agreement, hereby acknowledge full and
complete satisfaction of, and do hereby release and discharge and covenant not to sue the
other of them, including their respective heirs, assigns and successors in interest, parents,
predecessors, subsidiaries, controlled and controlling affiliated corporations and entities,
past and present, as well as the respective directors, officers, stockholders, partners,
agents, attorneys, servants, and employees, past and present, and affiliates or nominees of
parties (as defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and each of them, from
any and all claims, demands, and causes or sources of action of whatever kind or nature,
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, including all rights of and claims for
contribution and indemnification, and judgments, which any of them now owns or holds
or has at any time heretofore owned or held through the date of the Closing of this
Agreement against any of the other of them, including, but not limited to, those which:
(i) are or could have been alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutory or
final orders, rulings, file, or papers in the Pending Litigation; or (ii) arise out of, or are
related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with any transactions,
occurrences, acts or omissions set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in the
Pending Litigation. This provision shall receive the broadest possible interpretation as a
general and complete release.
URI agrees to and shall fully indemnify hold harmless, and defend all other
Parties to this Agreement including their respective heirs, assigns and successors in
interest, parents, predecessors, subsidiaries, controlled and affiliated corporations and
entities, past and present, as well as the respective directors, officers, stockholders,
parmers, agents, attorneys, servants, and employees, past and present, and affiliates or
nominees of parties (as defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and each of
them, from and against any and all claims, demands, and causes or sources of action of
whatever kind or nature, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, including all
rights of and claims for contribution and indemnification, and judgments, which
Midwest, RD Wolff or JJ Wolff now owns or holds or has at any time heretofore owned
or held through the date of the Closing of this Agreement against any of the Parties hereto
other than URI, including, but not limited to, those which (i) are or could have been
alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutory or final orders, rulings, file,
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or papers in the First State Action; or (ii) arise out of, or are related to, or are in any wav
connected directly or indirectly with any transactions, occurrences, acts or omissions set
forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in the First State Action; (iii) are or could have
been alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutory or final orders, rulings,
file, or papers in the Second State action; or (iv) arise out of or are related or are in any
way connected directly or indirectly with any transaction, occurrences, acts or omissions
set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in the Second State Action; or (v) arise out
of, or are related to, or are in any way connected with any transactions, occurrences, acts
or omissions set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in said Federal Action;
(vi) arise out of, are related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with the
Share Exchange Agreement or the Recision Agreement; (vii) arise out of, are related to,
or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with the 1993 Settlement Agreement; or
(viii) arise out of, or are related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with
the IMC Letter of Intent.
e.
The Parties agree that Jones shall serve as a director of URI for no less
than one year from the date of Closing, and the Parties agree to take all actions necessary
to maintain Jones as a director for said one year period. Sheen and Erickson shall resign
as members of the Board of Directors of URI as of the date of Closing. The successors to
Sheen and Erickson as members of the Board of Directors of URI shall be appointed in
accordance with the terms of the 1993 Settlement Agreement. That Board shall elect Fife
President and the other appropriate officers of URI. Erickson and Sheen agree that they
will not seek election as, and will not accept any future nominations to serve as, an officer
or director of URJ or Morgan Gas & Oil Co.
f.
The transactions contemplated in the IMC Letter of Intent shall close in
accordance with the provisions of that contemplated Stock Purchase Agreement between
URI and IMC (the "Stock Purchase Agreement"), the current form of which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "C," subject to negotiation and
execution of the definitive Stock Purchase Agreement and approval of its terms by the
URJ Board of Directors; provided, however, that the definitive Stock Purchase
Agreement must contain the following material provisions:
i.
IMC shall purchase and URI shall issue and sell shares at the Closing so that IMC
will own following the purchase 50.5% of the total outstanding common stock of URJ at
S3.3 5 per share as of the Closing, and URI shall issue an option for one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) or more additional shares of the capital stock of the Company at an
exercise price of S3.35 per share, payable in the same fashion as the shares purchased by
IMC to obtain 50.5% of the total outstanding stock of URI, such that IMC shall have at
all times the right to own 50.5% of the outstanding common stock of URI; provided,
however, that the options may only be exercised as corresponding outstanding options
held by others are exercised; and further provided that IMC shall be entitled to maintain
its 50.5% ownership of the outstanding common stock of URI in connection with any
Page 5

stock split, recapitalization, combination, or reorganization; and further provided that
IMC shall be entitled to maintain its 50.5% ownership of the outstanding common stock
ofURI in connection with any new issuance of stock or the issuance of instruments
convertible into stock, at the offering price of such new issuance, on payment terms
similar to those set forth herein;
ii.

IMC shall pay 15% of the purchase price in cash at closing;

iii.
the balance of the purchase price shall be evidenced by a note ("Note") which
bears interest at a rate equal to the short-term applicable federal rate published by the Internal
Revenue Service, pursuant to Section 1274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, in effect at the time of the Closing, adjusted on each anniversary date of this
Agreement until the purchase price has been paid in full.
iv.
IMC shall pay the first year's interest in cash at Closing, discounted at the interest
rate noted in (iii) above, and interest shall be paid annually in arrears on each anniversary of the
Note thereafter, beginning with the second year's anniversary date, with the principal due and
payable August 1, 2001;
v.

the Note shall be secured by a pledge of IMC's URI stock;

vi.
John Fife, the sole shareholder and president of IMC, will personally guarantee
twenty-five percent (25%) of the outstanding balance of the Note;
vii.
after closing, any distributions and other payments otherwise payable to IMC on
its URI stock will be applied to reduce the outstanding principal balance of the Note;
viii. subsequent to closing, IMC shall cause URI to cause a 1,000 to 1 share reverse
split at S3.35 per share;
!
ix.
fractional shareholders of record as of the date of the reverse split shall be given
the option to purchase additional fractional shares to round up to the next whole share;
x.
URI indemnifies IMC, its shareholders, officers, directors, agents, employees and
attorneys, including but not limited to those arising out of the negotiation, execution and
consummation of this Agreement, and including advancement of their legal fees and costs, and
from and against liability arising out of the IMC Letter of Intent, the Stock Purchase Agreement
and transactions contemplated hereby;
xi.
IMC shall take all actions necessary to cause URI to honor its obligations to
indemnify its officers and directors, agents, employees and attorneys, including but not limited to
those arising out of the negotiation, execution and consummation of this Agreement, and
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including advancement of their legal fees and costs, in connection with all present and future
litigation.
xii.
URI shall hire Fife under a written employment agreement which shall provide
reasonable compensation for services rendered, which compensation in any year shall not exceed
5200,000. The payment of compensation in excess of that provided in the employment
agreement shall be used to reduce any obligations due or to become due under the Note.
xiii. The Parties covenant to provide a copy of the definitive Stock Purchase
Agreement to Jones and counsel of his choosing at least two days prior to the Closing, to review
for consistency with the provisions above.
f.
The number of shares acquired by URI in the reverse split contemplated in
the Stock Purchase Agreement shall be available for purchase by all remaining
shareholders of URI, other than IMC, as of a record date five days prior to the
effectuation of the reverse split at a price of S3.3 5 per share; provided, however, that URI
shall not be required to make the shares available for purchase if to do so would be in
violation of federal or state securities laws after after URI has taken all actions necessary
to comply. Notice shall be given to the shareholders of the availability of such purchase
and to the extent the amount of shares available is oversubscribed, each person
subscribing for such shares shall be allowed to purchase a pro-rata portion of the
available shares. The terms of the purchase of such shares by each shareholder shall be a
cash down payment of 25% with the balance payable in three years with simple interest at
the short term applicable federal rate for the month of this Agreement which interest shall
be payable annually in arrears. The obligation shall be secured by a pledge of the stock
acquired pursuant to a stock pledge agreement to be drafted by counsel for URI. Any
distributions to shareholders of URI shall first be applied to the unpaid balance of any
amounts owing URI hereunder.
g.
The 40,552 outstanding shares of URI stock owned by A Morgan and
V Morgan, which they represent and warrant are all the URI shares they own, shall be
purchased by URI for a cash price of S3.35 per share which purchase shall occur at
Closing of this Agreement.
h.
Legal fees and expenses and other costs associated with the Pending
Litigation and the documents and negotiations to complete and implement the settlement
contemplated by this Agreement shall be paid as follows:
(i) All legal fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses incurred or paid by
Jones, IMC, Fife, Erickson, Sheen, Hurd and MTC from January 1, 1996 to
Closing shall be reimbursed or paid by URI.
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(ii) All legal fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses incurred or paid by
V. Morgan and A Morgan, subject to a dollar limitation of 581,000, shall be
reimbursed or paid by URI.
(iii) All other expenses incurred, except as provided above, shall be paid
by the Party incurring such expense.
i.
From the date of this Agreement URI shall be allowed to conduct its
affairs in the normal course of business, except as otherwise limited or modified by the
First State Action, the 1993 Settlement Agreement and the Murphy Order.
j.
All employment agreements contemplated, negotiated or executed
between URI and Sheen, Hurd, and Erickson shall not be effectuated and, if effectuated,
shall be terminated.
k.
Except for completion of pending matters approved by the Board,
Robinson & Sheen, L.L.C. shall resign as legal counsel for URI effective at Closing.
1.
The Parties hereto-shall exercise their best efforts to account for, pay,
compromise, unwind, and/or terminate all existing contractual relationships between URI
and Morgan Gas & Oil Co.
4.

Representations and Warranties of the Parties.

a.
The corporate Parties, URI, MTC, and IMC represent and warrant that
they are validly existing and in good standing in the state of their organization and have
the full legal right, power and authority to execute and deliver this Agreement and to
carry out all transactions contemplated herein. Each individual signing this Agreement
on behalf of a corporation, parmership, trust, or other entity, represents and warrants that
he or she has the authority to do so.
b.
All Parties represent and warrant that they have negotiated at arms-length
with a view to arriving at a fair and equitable settlement of their differences,
c.
All Parties represent and warrant that, to the best of their belief, the terms
of this Agreement are fair to and in the best interests of URI and its shareholders.
d.
All Parties covenant that no actions of any kind shall be undertaken by the
Parties to affirmatively prosecute the Pending Litigation, nor will the Parties instigate any
new legal proceedings against any of the other Parties.
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e.
All Parties represent and warrant that they have not assigned or transferred
any claims against any of the other Parties, including any interest in the Pending
Litigation, to any third party not a party to this Agreement.
5.
This Agreement has been freely and voluntarily executed by all Parties hereto
after having been apprised of all relevant information and having been represented by counsel.
No party hereto has relied upon any inducements, promises or representations made by any other
party or other party's attorney, other than those specifically set out in this Agreement, which
constitutes the entire, integrated understanding among the Parties.
6.
Each party agrees to perform such other further acts and to execute and deliver
such further documents as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Agreement
7.
The Parties hereto, and each of them, acknowledge that this Agreement is the
compromise and settlement of the claims and demands between and among the Parties and
nothing contained herein shall be construed as an admission of their validity or invalidity against
the interests of the Parties hereto, or any of them, except that this disclaimer does not affect the
validity or truthfulness of the affirmative statements, admissions, affidavits, filings, notices, and
writings made and agreed to be made under the terms of this Agreement.
8.
Except as to continuing covenants and obligations set forth in the 1993 Settlement
Agreement and the Murphy Order, all claims, rights, causes of action, or defenses of the Parties
raised in the Pending Litigation are herewith merged into and fully resolved as a part of this
Agreement.
9.
All Parties to this Agreement have read and fully comprehend and understand the
terms and provisions of this Agreement and of the ancillary exhibits and documents incorporated
herein. All Parties have been advised by legal counsel who presently represent them in
connection with this settlement as to the content, meaning and execution of this Agreement. All
Parties to this Agreement have voluntarily and without coercion signed the same and understand
and agree to each and every paragraph hereof.
10.
No Party hereto shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or seek to solicit any person to
challenge any provision hereof or to file suit comparable to any suit dismissed hereunder or to
contest the dismissal of the Pending Litigation. Tnis covenant of good faith shall be central to
this Agreement and any Party damaged by a breach thereof shall be entitled to all remedies
available at law or in equity as well as a recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
11.

General Provisions.

a.
Binding Agreement. Tnis Agreement shall be binding upon and shall
inure to the benefit of the heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, as
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applicable, of the respective parties hereto, and any entities resulting from the
reorganization, consolidation or merger of any party hereto.
b.
Headines. The headings used in this Agreement are inserted for reference
purposes only and shall not be deemed to limit or affect in any way the meaning or
interpretation of any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement.
c.
Counterparts. This Agreement may be signed upon any number of
counterparts with the same effect as if the signature to any counterpart were upon the
same instrument.
d.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the exhibits and
schedules hereto (which are incorporated herein by this reference), constitutes the entire
agreement and understanding between and among the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof and shall supersede any prior agreements and understandings among the
parties with respect to such subject matter.
e.
Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are severable, and should
any provision hereof be found to be void, voidable or unenforceable, such void, voidable
or unenforceable provision shall not affect any other portion or provision-of this
Agreement.
f.
Survival of Representations. Warranties and Covenants. The
representations, warranties and covenants of the Parties shall survive the Closing.
g.
Waiver. Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or
character whatsoever by any other party, whether such waiver be direct or implied, shall
not be construed as a continuing waiver or consent to any subsequent breach of this
Agreement on the part of the other party.
h.
Modification. This Agreement may not be modified except by.an
instrument in writing signed by all of the parties hereto.
i.
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and
enforced according to the laws of the State of Utah.
j.
Attorney's Fees. In the event any action or proceeding is brought by any
Party against any other Party under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled
to recover attorney's fees and costs in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable.
k.
Notice. All notices or other communications required or permitted to be
given pursuant to this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be considered as properly
given when personally served or deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
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registered or certified, with return receipt requested, or by prepaid telegram, telecopy or
deposited with a recognized courier for overnight delivery. Notice given in any such
manner shall be effective when received or three (3) days after mailing or sending. The
addresses of the parties shall be as set forth on Schedule 11 .j. attached hereto.
Each Party shall have the right to change its address for purposes of this section to any other
location within the continental United States by giving thirty (30) days' notice to the other Parties
in the manner set forth in this section.
11.
In the event that Closing does not occur for any reason, the term of the 1993
Settlement Agreement shall be extended by the number of days elapsing between the date hereof
and the date of the event causing the failure to close.
DATED the date and year first set forth above.
URI:
Utah Resources International, Inc., a Utah
corporation

By:.
Its:
ERICKSON:

fl.ftte&L
R. Dee Erickson
SHEEN:

E. Jayiftheen )
HURD:

Lyle D. Hurci
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JONES:

MarK G. Jones

£ /

MTC:
Mark Technologies Corporation, a
California corporation

j

fiB=>\i>Etfr<y_

A MORGAN:

Anne Morgan, ini
V MORGAN:

Victoria Morgan
INTER-MOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORP, a
Delaware corporation

By.

FIFE

John

Page 12

W

SU.

JAT

/

ROBINSON &. SHEEN, L.L.C.
By:
Its:

APPROVED:
Jenny T. Morgan
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
W.D. Wisconsin.
Robert E. GILSON, M.D., Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation, Gilson Inc., and
Gilson S.A.S. Plaintiffs,
v.
RAININ INSTRUMENT, LLC, Rainin Group, Inc.,
and Mettler-Toledo, Inc.,
Defendants.
No. 04-C-852-S.
Aug. 9, 2005.
Allen A. Arntsen, Foley & Lardner LLP, Madison,
WI, for Plaintiffs.
Bruce A. Schultz, Coyne Niess Schultz Becker &
Bauer, Madison, WI, for Defendants.

law pursuant to Rule 50(b) the Court determines
whether the evidence presented, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party and combined
with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in
favor of the prevailing party, is sufficient to support
the verdict. Tennes v. Mass. Dep't of Revenue, 944
F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir.1991). The Court does not
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses nor otherwise
weigh the evidence. Id.
Liability Verdict:
At the close of the liability phase of trial, the jury
was asked two special verdict questions relating to
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim:
1. Did defendant Rainin materially breach its
obligation to use its best efforts to promote and
sell plaintiff Gilson's Pipetman?
2. Did Rainin materially breach its obligation to
promote and sell in good faith Gilson's Pipetman?
The jury answered "no" to the first question and
"yes" to the second.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
SHABAZ,J.
*1 This action for breach of contract and violation
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) &
(B), was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in
plaintiffs' favor finding that defendants materially
breached the parties' exclusive distributorship
contract. Plaintiffs opted to terminate the contract,
and the jury awarded damages to plaintiffs Robert
E. Gilson and the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation for lost royalties in the amount of
$70,000 and to plaintiff Gilson S.A.S. for lost
profits in the amount of $500,000. Judgment was
entered accordingly. The matter is presently before
the Court on plaintiffs' and defendants' Rule 50(b)
renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law.
MEMORANDUM
In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of

Defendants maintain two objections to the second
question. First, they contend that their failure to
promote and sell in good faith does not support a
cause of action for breach of contract. Second, they
repeat their summary judgment argument that the
parties agreed to an objective performance standard
by which their compliance with this obligation
should be measured, which they satisfied by selling
at least 43,336 Gilson pipettes per year.
Defendants' first challenge relies on the mantra,
acknowledged by the Court on summary judgment,
that the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
in § 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), Wis. Stat. § 401.203, "does not support an
independent cause of action for failure to perform
or enforce in good faith." Wis. Stat. § 401.203 cmt;
Hauer v. Union State Bank, 192 Wis.2d 576, 597,
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532 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Ct.App.1995). The UCC
Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) added this
statement to the § 1-203 Official Comment in 1994.
The addition reads in full as follows:
This section does not support an independent
cause of action for failure to perform or enforce
in good faith. Rather, this section means that a
failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a
specific duty or obligation under the contract,
constitutes a breach of that contract or makes
unavailable, under the particular circumstances, a
remedial right or power. This distinction makes it
clear that the doctrine of good faith merely directs
a court towards interpreting contracts within the
commercial context in which they are created,
performed, and enforced, and does not create a
separate duty of fairness and reasonableness
which can be independently breached.
*2 Wis. Stat. § 401.203 cmt. The PEB issued
Commentary No. 10 to clarify the meaning of this
addition, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has
quoted this Commentary with approval. Hauer, 192
Wis.2d at 597 n. 7, 532 N.W.2d at 464 n. 7. It
explains:
The inherent flaw in the view that § 1-203
supports an independent cause of action is the
belief that the obligation of good faith has an
existence which is conceptually separate from the
underlying agreement.... [T]his is an incorrect
view of the duty. "A party cannot simply 'act in
good faith.' One acts in good faith relative to the
agreement of the parties. Thus the real question is
'What is the Agreement of the parties?' " Put
differently, good faith merely directs attention to
the parties' reasonable expectations; it is not an
independent source from which rights and duties
evolve.... Consequently, resort to principles of
law or equity outside the Code are not
appropriate to create rights, duties, and liabilities
inconsistent with those stated in the Code. For
example, a breach of a contract or duty within the
Code arising from a failure to act in good faith
does not give rise to a claim for punitive damages
unless specifically permitted.
PEB Commentary No. 10: Section 1-203 (Feb. 10,
1994), reprinted in Unif. Commercial Code app. 2,
3B U.L.A. 135, 136-37 (Supp.2002) (quoting
Dennis Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability

143 (1990)).
Accordingly, the duty of good faith does not
provide an independent source of obligations from
which a court may draw to reform agreements
because they appear with the benefit of hindsight to
be inequitable or unreasonable. Original Great Am.
Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd, 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir.1992).
"Good faith" requires only that a party to an
agreement perform its obligations under the
agreement with fidelity to the other party's
promise-induced reasonable expectations. As
Professor Corbin explains:
If the purpose of contract law is to enforce the
reasonable expectations of parties induced by
promises, then at some point it becomes
necessary for courts to look to the substance
rather than to the form of the agreement, and to
hold that substance controls over form. What
courts are doing here, whether calling the process
"implication" of promises, or interpreting the
requirements of "good faith," as the current
fashion may be, is but a recognition that the
parties occasionally have understandings or
expectations that were so fundamental that they
did not need to negotiate about those
expectations. When the court "implies a promise"
or holds that "good faith" requires a party not to
violate those expectations, it is recognizing that
sometimes silence says more than words, and it is
understanding its duty to the spirit of the bargain
is higher than its duty to the technicalities of the
language.
Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 570
(West Supp.1993), quoted in PEB Commentary No.
10: Section 1-203, supra, 3B U.L.A. at 138 n. 13.
Accordingly, Judge Manion observed for the
Seventh Circuit in Beraha v. Baxter Health Care
Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1445 (7th Cir.1992), that
although the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing does not create "an enforceable legal duty
to be nice or to behave decently in a general way,"
it does require each party to an agreement to
exercise any discretion afforded it by the agreement
in a manner consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the other party.
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*3 This is the standard to which defendants have
been held. The special verdict did not ask whether
defendants had breached some independent duty of
good faith or invite the jury to substitute some
amorphous standard of community morality for the
parties'
reasonable
promise-induced
and
investment-backed expectations. Under the parties'
exclusive dealing agreement, defendants had an
obligation to promote and sell Gilson's Pipetman
pipettes. The agreement left to Rainin discretion to
determine how it would do so. Although the
agreement allowed Rainin significant discretion in
this regard, its discretion was not unlimited. To the
contrary, its discretion was fettered by the
obligation that it perform its obligation in good faith
(i.e., in a manner consistent with Gilson's
reasonable
promise-induced
expectations).
Consequently, the Court instructed the jury as
follows:
BREACH OF CONTRACT: DUTY OF GOOD
FAITH
Under Wisconsin law, the contract between
Rainin and Gilson requires that each party act in
good faith towards the other party and deal fairly
with that party when carrying out the terms of the
contract. This requirement to act in good faith is a
part of the contract just as though the contract
stated it.
Rainin had an obligation to use good faith when
promoting and selling Gilson pipettes. Gilson
claims that Rainin breached its good faith
obligation by attempting to convince customers to
purchase Rainin's pipettes instead of Gilson's
pipettes or by replacing customers' Gilson
pipettes with Rainin pipettes.
Whether the duty to act in good faith has been
met in this case should be determined by deciding
what the contractual expectations of the parties
were. Therefore, in deciding whether Rainin
breached the duty of good faith by attempting to
convince customers to purchase Rainin's pipettes
instead of Gilson's pipettes or by replacing
customers' Gilson pipettes with Rainin pipettes,
you should determine the purpose of the
agreement; that is, the benefits the parties
expected at the time the agreement was made.
This duty of good faith means honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial

standards of fair dealing in the trade.
The jury was then asked, "Did Rainin materially
breach its obligation to promote and sell in good
faith Gilson's Pipetman?" Responding in the
affirmative, the jury found in Rainin's conduct not a
breach of some independent duty but a material
breach of contract, the terms of which found
meaning in their entirety from the promise-induced
expectations of the parties.
Defendants'
second challenge repeats their
summary judgment argument that the parties agreed
to an objective performance standard by which their
compliance with their obligation to promote and sell
in good faith should be measured, which they argue
that they satisfied by selling at least 43,336 Gilson
pipettes per year. Although the obligation to
perform in good faith may not be disclaimed by
agreement, the parties may agree to determine the
standard by which the performance of this
obligation is to be measured. Wis. Stat. § 401.102(3)
("the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by chs. 401 to
411 may not be disclaimed by agreement but the
parties may by agreement determine the standards
by which the performance of such obligations is to
be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable"). However, as the Court found on
summary judgment, defendants' argument that the
parties here intended to set such a standard is
unpersuasive. Defendants point to the following
clause within the agreement:
*4 Provided that Mettler remains the exclusive
distributor of all Gilson volume adjustable
mechanical pipettes, if annual sales of
PRODUCTS by Mettler in the U.S. in any
calendar year are less than one half the unit
sales of Current Pipetman Products in calendar
year 2000, then the Gilsons shall have the right
by written notice to Mettler to convert Mettler's
rights under the [1972 Agreement] from
exclusive to nonexclusive; provided, however,
that such exclusivity shall not lapse in the event
such volume limitations are not achieved as a
result of significant quality problems, Acts of
God, significant logistical problems, or similar
events causing a significant disruption in supply.
(emphasis added.) As the Court pointed out on
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summary judgment, this clause provides neither a
source nor a measure of contractual obligations. In
condition-subsequent form, the clause recognizes a
condition the occurrence of which would excuse
Gilson's exclusivity commitment to Rainin. It would
be manifestly unreasonable to say that a provision
of the agreement which does not obligate a party to
act or refrain from acting provides the measure by
which that party's good faith is to be judged. Were
this clause to provide the sole measure of
defendants' good faith, then defendants would not
be obligated to perform their contractual obligations
in good faith. In effect, defendants' interpretation
disclaims the duty of good faith contrary to Wis.
Stat. § 401.102(3), which expressly precludes such
a result.
Implied Covenant of Best Efforts
Plaintiffs maintain that no reasonable juror could
have answered "no" to the first question: "Did
defendant Rainin materially breach its obligation to
use its best efforts to promote and sell plaintiff
Gilson's Pipetman?" Defendants now recognize that
they were obligated to use best efforts to promote
and sell Gilson's Pipetman pipettes. Prior to the
liability verdict they had maintained that they had
no such duty or, in the alternative, that their
compliance with any duty to use best efforts should
be measured by the clause which they now propose
to be the proper measure of their obligation to
promote and sell in good faith. Defendants argue
that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
support the jury's verdict that they did not materially
breach their obligation to use best efforts. They
argue further that in light of their obligation to use
best efforts, a separate question directed to their
good faith should not have been asked.
Defendants' concession that Rainin was obligated
to use its best efforts to promote and sell Gilson's
Pipetman pipettes verifies, a fortiori, that it was
obligated to promote and sell in good faith. The
"best efforts" standard implied in exclusive dealing
agreements by Wis. Stat. § 402.306(2) obligates the
parties "to use reasonable diligence as well as good
faith in their performance of the contract." Wis.
Stat. § 402.306 cmt.

The Seventh Circuit has observed that courts
applying the best-efforts and good-faith standards
have at times "muddled" the two concepts. Beraha,
956 F.2d at 1443. Professor Farnsworth describes
the distinction between the two as follows:
*5 Because courts sometimes confuse the
standard of best efforts with that of good faith, it
will be well at the outset to make plain the
distinction between the two standards. Good faith
is a standard that has honesty and fairness at its
core and that is imposed on every party to a
contract. Best efforts is a standard that has
diligence as its essence and is imposed only on
those contracting parties that have undertaken
such performance. The two standards are distinct
and that of best efforts is the more exacting.
E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's
Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract Law,
46 U. Pitt. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1984) (discussing Zilg v.
Prentice-Hall, 111 F.2d 671 (2d Cir.1983)).
At trial, the Court understood plaintiffs to suggest
breaches both of the diligence and good faith
aspects of Rainin's duty to use best efforts. Wary of
"muddling" these distinct aspects, the Court
adopted plaintiffs' suggestion to provide each with
its own instruction and corresponding special
verdict question. As discussed, one question
focused on Rainin's good faith performance of its
obligation to promote and sell Gilson's pipettes. The
other, titled "best efforts," addressed the additional
diligence aspect of Rainin's duty:
BREACH OF CONTRACT: DUTY OF BEST
EFFORTS
The contract between Rainin and Gilson requires
Rainin to use its "best efforts" to promote and sell
Gilson pipettes. The duty to use best efforts
requires Rainin to use reasonable efforts and due
diligence in the promotion of Gilson's pipettes.
Gilson claims that Rainin breached its best efforts
obligation by using various marketing and sales
methods to convince customers to purchase
Rainin pipettes instead of Gilson pipettes or to
replace Gilson pipettes with Rainin pipettes.
There is no dispute that the parties' agreement
permits Rainin to manufacture pipettes which
compete with Gilson pipettes. Nevertheless,
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Rainin's privilege to compete with Gilson is not
absolute. The means that Rainin may employ to
compete with Gilson are limited by Rainin's
obligation to use reasonable efforts and due
diligence in the promotion and sale of Gilson's
pipettes. Although Rainin has a general right to
promote the sale of a competing brand of pipettes
and thereby lessen Gilson's share of the market,
there will be a point where Rainin's methods are
so manifestly harmful to Gilson as to justify the
finding that Rainin has breached its obligation to
Gilson.
While compliance with the "best efforts" standard
requires good faith plus diligence, this instruction
directed the jury to consider only the additional
diligence aspect of the obligation. The instruction
makes no mention of the "good faith" limits implicit
in Rainin's duty to diligently promote and sell
Gilson's pipettes. That aspect was separately
presented in the other instruction and special verdict
question.
At trial, plaintiffs' argument focused on Rainin's
disparaging use of the Pipetman to promote and sell
its own pipettes. Plaintiffs' argument sounded in the
bad faith associated with a party's failure to honor
the other party's reasonable promise-induced
expectations in the performance of its contractual
obligations. The evidence presented thus nestled
more comfortably in the good faith instruction.
Plaintiffs presented less, if any, evidence directed at
the additional "diligence" aspect imposed by the
more exacting best efforts standard. Plaintiffs'
principal concern was not nonfeasance or
competence but malfeasance. Thus the jury
reasonably found in plaintiffs' favor as to the good
faith verdict question and rejected a finding that
Rainin had breached the additional diligence
requirement imposed by the duty to use best efforts.
As a matter of law, however, defendants' material
failure to promote and sell in good faith violated
both the "good faith" and the more exacting "best
efforts" standards. Consequently, plaintiffs' Rule 50
motion will be granted.
Damages Verdict

jury awarded damages to Gilson S.A.S. for lost
profits in the amount of $500,000. Defendants
maintain that Gilson S.A.S. is not entitled to recover
lost profits from Rainin because Rainin was not
obligated to purchase Pipetman pipettes from
Gilson.
Plaintiff Dr. Robert E. Gilson and his father Dr.
Warren E. Gilson are the named co-inventors of
U.S. Patent No. 3,827,305, which was filed for
certain adjustable volume manual pipettes on
October 24, 1972. In December 1972 Warren and
Robert Gilson entered into a "Capital Gains License
Agreement" with Rainin Instrument Co., Inc. Under
this 1972 Agreement, the Gilsons granted Rainin
the exclusive right in the United States to use the
method described in the '305 patent and technical
information relating to processes, invention and
methods relating to the manufacture of pipettes
under the patent, including "the exclusive and
perpetual right to make, use and sell under the
aforesaid
technical
information
and patent
application." The '305 patent issued on August 6,
1974.
Gilson S.A.S. has manufactured the pipette
disclosed by the '305 patent since 1972. Gilson
owns the "Gilson" and "Pipetman" trademarks,
under which this pipette was promoted and sold by
Rainin throughout the United States. Throughout
the course of the parties' relationship, Gilson S.A.S.
has sold its pipettes to Rainin for distribution to the
public. The Gilson Pipetman pipette is the largest
selling pipette in the United States. Known for its
reliability and durability, it has become the industry
standard. Gilson S.A.S. realized a profit from
selling its Pipetman pipettes to Rainin. Additionally,
Robert E. Gilson and the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation received what the parties
describe as a "royalty" of $8.50 for every Pipetman
pipette that Rainin sold.
Defendants argue that Rainin was not obligated to
purchase pipettes from Gilson because Rainin could
manufacture them itself. Consequently, they argue
that Gilson had no expectation of profit resulting
from their sale to Rainin.

*6 At the close of the damages phase of trial, the
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Defendants' argument overstates its rights under the
1972 Agreement. Pursuant to this agreement, Rainin
could manufacture and sell the pipette disclosed by
the '305 patent. It could not, however, promote and
sell its pipettes under the "Gilson" and "Pipetman"
names because it had no right to use these
trademarks in connection with the promotion and
sale of any pipette not manufactured by Gilson. Nor
could it do so when the '305 patent expired in 1991.
Rainin was the exclusive U.S. distributor of the
Pipetman pipette. As a consequence of this
exclusive distributorship arrangement, Rainin was
obligated to promote and sell Pipetman pipettes.
Because Gilson was the only source of Pipetman
pipettes, Rainin was obligated to purchase Pipetman
pipettes from Gilson. Defendants' motion will be
denied.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' renewed motion
for judgment on as a matter of law is DENIED.
*7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs'
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is
GRANTED.
END OF DOCUMENT
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EXHIBIT "C"

MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
MARK JONES

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 980900576
Judge Fratto

V.
UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC.
JOHN FIFE, LYLE D. HURD, JR.
GERRY BROWN

Following trial, the matter was taken under advisement. The claims and issues are herein
addressed as the Utah Court of Appeals has remanded them.
The grant of summary judgment was affirmed for .First Claim for Relief (Breach of
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against URI, Fife and Hurd), and Seventh
Claim for Relief (Declaring the Purported Options are Null and Void Against URI, John Fife,
David Fife, Hurd and Brown). These claims are now evaluated to determine whether the actions
taken by U.R.I, in approving an employment contract for John Fife, and in nullifying stock
options for Hurd, Brown and Fife occurred because of plaintiffs' lawsuit.
The court finds that the Board, at a meeting on October 24,1996, tabled the issue of the
employment contract until thirty days after the shareholders meeting on December 11, 1997. The
lawsuit was filed on January 20, 1998, and the Board approved the agreement on February 27,
1998.
The agreement is perfunctory, its only provision, setting the amount of compensation,
deals with the only specific provision required by the June 26, 1996 settlement agreement. At the
shareholders meeting of March 8,1999, John Fife makes an admission that there was approval of
1
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the contract, "...in an effort to resolve a legal claim brought by Mr. Jones." Both the timing and
substance of events lends weight to plaintiffs'claim.
Concerning the stock options, there was evidence showing that the additional options
were never intended, resulted from misunderstandings, were never exercised, and no benefit
therefrom inured to defendants. Defendants, even with Jones' urging, did not believe there to be
any need or importance in setting the books and records straight concerning these options.
They may be right. However, the mandate is to evaluate whether action was taken as a
result of the lawsuit.
The timing of the waiver of the stock options is compelling. The court finds that after
urging and inaction, to either disavow or ratify the options, no action was taken until after filing
the lawsuit
Consequently, the court is convinced to a preponderance of the evidence that both the
approval of the Fife employment contract and the waiver nullifying the additional options
occurred because of the lawsuit.
Plaintiffs' fourth claim ties the additional stock options as compensation for an
employment agreement between URI and Hurd, and asserts that failure to terminate the contract
is a breach of the settlement agreement. The Court of Appeal's mandate requires this court to
determine whether such a contract was "effectuated."
Plaintiffs theory is that the additional stock options were compensation for employment,
and reflecting those additional options in the corporate record not only demonstrate an
employment contract, but also show it was "effectuated.".
Hurd had done work for URI in the past that was beyond his duties as a Board member.
2
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As indicated above, there was considerable speculation, and several alternative theories,
explaining the additional options: gift, mistake, misunderstanding, clerical error.
There was little evidence that connected the options, beyond the fact that there was a
record of options, to any employment contract with Hurd. Specifically, there was no nexis
between value of the options and past work for the corporation.
There was an anticipation of employment, but no connection that convincing established
that the stock was compensation for the employment, and, consequently, that the employment
agreement had been made effective.
Plaintiff has no cause of action.
In summary, the court is not convinced of an "effectuated" employment contract with
Hurd, but does find that the stock options were waived and voided, and the Fife employment
agreement entered into because of the lawsuit.
Second Claim for Relief alleges a breach by defendants of a contractual obligation to use
their best efforts to "account for, pay, compromise, unwind, and/or terminate all existing
contractual relationships" with Morgan Gas Company. Plaintiffs' have the burden of proof to
demonstrate, to a preponderance of the evidence, that defendants did not use their best efforts to
achieve this goal.
In determining what constitutes "best efforts," particular circumstances must be
considered. Each defendant is in a different position to exert an effort to accomplish the goal.
Where several people are working toward a goal, they cannot work at cross-purposes.
Consequently, the laboring oar might properly be in the hands of one person, the others best
serving by doing nothing.
3
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Defendants also had a fiduciary obligation to accomplish their contractual obligation to
the benefit of URI. Severing the relationship with MGO would be a relatively easy task, if URI's
best interests are ignored.
The unwinding of URI's relationship with MGO is a business proposition involving
business decisions and strategies. It is difficult to second guess whether one strategy or decision
was incorrect or represented a failure to exert best efforts. John Fife's approach was to first
marshal, organize and analyze the records of URI. He then resolved specific situations both
directly and indirectly connected to the MGO unwinding, before working on a global resolution.
John Fife, as part of his management obligations, had many responsibilities. He
prioritized both the tasks within the unwinding process, and in relation to all activities connected
with his performance as president of the corporation.
The MGO unwinding did not occupy the top most priority of all his responsibilities.
However, "best efforts" does not mean to elevate the task above all others. It means to make the
best effort possible in the context of the circumstances and situation. Further, prioritizing within
the unwinding process is appropriate. Fife made determinations that some things needed to be
done before other things. It is difficult to find a failure of best efforts, even if there are legitimate
concerns with the order of priority.
Plaintiffs' argue that the lengthy period of time wherein URI appears to have no contact
with MGO is evidence of failure of best efforts. Although there was no direct communication
with some members of the MGO team during this period, contact with John Morgan did
continue. Mr. Morgan appears to have been a key to successfully concluding the unwinding.
Some of his concerns were considered and actions to resolve them were taken during this period.
4
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When considering strategies, priorities, the other actions taken, the court cannot conclude
that this period of no communication represents a failure of best efforts.
Consequently, the court is not convinced to a preponderance of the evidence that best
efforts were not made by defendants, and finds no cause of action.
Plaintiff seeks in his tenth claim, reimbursement for certain "expenses", including
consultation with attorneys, administrative work, telephone and the like, generally characterized
as expenses incurred to fulfill his duties as a member of the Board of Directors.
The court finds that URI is not obligated to pay these charges.
Article III, Sec. 9 of the Articles of Incorporation limit reimbursement of expenses to
those incurred for "....attendance at each meeting...," and then only by resolution of the Board.
The member is entitled to that which was expended to attend a meeting.(transportation, meals,
hotels while away from home. If attending by telephone, long distance charges) Reimbursement
of expenses incurred to perform duties, or in preparation for attending a meeting, are not
sanctioned by this provision.
The court finds that other Board members were neither incurring nor billing similar
expenses.
Plaintiff sent several invoices seeking reimbursement. There appears to have been no
attempt to obtain a resolution from the Board for either prior authorization of, or to pay that
which had been incurred. There is no resolution that authorizes Jones to incur these types of
expenses.
Fife informed plaintiff on several occasions that the invoices would not be reimbursed.
Plaintiff continued to incur and bill the expense. There was no action or representation by any
5

defendant that could reasonably mislead plaintiff into believing that these expenses were or
would be authorized.
There were discussions about payment of both Board members' "expenses," and attorney
fees and costs incurred by individual member associated with litigation. There is nothing in those
discussions, or in resolutions approving attorney fees and litigation costs for some members, that
convinces the court of some implied or de facto authorization of plaintiff s claim. The only
discemable policy toward members' expenses beyond attending meetings, was to reimburse for
attorney fees and cost if the litigation was associated with Board membership.
Accordingly, plaintiff has no cause of action.
Having determined the prevailing party on each remanded issue and claim, the award of
attorney fees must now be resolved. The clerk is directed to set a telephonic scheduling
conference.
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MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORP.a
California Corporation, and MARK JONtfc,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEYS'
FEES

vs.
UTAH^SOimCESINT»roNAL,
INC., a Utah Corporation, JOFfl* f %
DAVID FIFE, LYLE D. KURD, Jr., GERRY
BROWN, individuals,

Case no. 980900576MI
Judge Joseph C. Fratto Jr.

Defendants

, A all
all claims
claims or
of ai
all of the parties in the above action, now enters
The Court having resolved
• the
u parties
orriP.' cross
cross-motions for attorneys' fees as follows:
er regarding
TU3raatterlS,efaettleCoUIto0theP^motionSroraWardotattomeysfte3.0n

August 4, 2004,

,f their respective awards, and no objections
submitted statements of the amount ot

to such

,
n d Based on the Minute Entry and the parties' statements, the
statements have been filed. Based on
. „ • „ r.rArr awarding attorneys fees:
therefore makes the following order awarai 0

1.

Attorneys fees and costs are awarded to the Plaintiffs in the amount of S34.834.02

as caicdated in the P l a i n s ' Statement of Attorneys Fees and Costs Pursuant to Order of
August 4,2004.
2.

Attorneys fees and costs are

awarded to the Defendants in the amount of

, i * J • ^Defendants' Statement of Attorneys Fees and Costs.
SI 10,187.77, as calculated in the Defendants OUJ.
3.

;

The award to the

Plaintiffs shall be set off against the award to Defendants, and a

of the Defendants and against each of Plaintiffs in the Net
final judgment shall issue in favor •
Amount of $75,353.75.
DATED this _ H day of November. 2004.

BY THE COURT:

Judge Joseph C. Frattc^
Third Judicial District Court

Approved as to form:
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.

eid Larhbe
Attorney for Plaintiff
WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON, LLP

iWd
Lu^y C. Lisiejtvji
Attorney for Defendants

